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THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK
IN CONTROLLING CORRUPTION
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN*
Widespread corruption is a symptom that the state is functioning
poorly. Ineffective states can retard and misdirect economic growth.
International aid and lending organizations have begun to focus on
corruption control as part of a general rethinking of their role in the
post-Cold War world. Both James Wolfensohn, the President of the
World Bank (Bank), and Michel Camdessus, the head of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), have put the control of corruption on
their institutions' agendas.'
Nevertheless, some argue that corruption is a political issue and is,
therefore, outside the purview of the World Bank. Corruption, how-
ever, has fundamental economic impacts and is thus an appropriate
area for World Bank and IMF concern. Bribes represent illegal user
fees, taxes, or access charges paid to public agents. These payments
influence economic decisions ranging from the size and character of
public investment projects to the level of compliance with business
regulations. It is difficult to see how a concern for the economic costs of
corruption can be responsibly excluded from World Bank lending
criteria.
Of course, bribery is often tied to politics. Some countries have weak
laws against bribery; other countries' leaders only enforce the law
against political opponents. Corrupt top officials regularly take a cut
for themselves of lucrative state activities. Widespread corruption at the
top, however, is not itself evidence that most people accept such a state
of affairs. Surveys of popular attitudes suggest that such tolerance is
* Henry R_ Luce Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School. This Essay was presented as
the Philip A. Hart Memorial Lecture, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C.,
March 18, 1997. Many of the issues dealt with in this Essay will be developed further in SUSAN
RoSE-AcKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOOD GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND STRATEGIES FOR
REFORM (forthcoming from Cambridge University Press in 1999).
1. Since this lecture was delivered in March 1997, both the IMF and the World Bank have
promulgated new policies against corruption. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, Newsbrief
97/15, IMF Adopts Guidelines Regarding Governance Issues (Aug. 4, 1997) <http://www.imf.org./
external/np/sec/nb/1997/NB9715.HTM>; WORLD BANK, POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC
MANAGEMENT NETWORK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION (1997). In preparing the lecture
for publication, I have not tried to incorporate the contents of these documents because they were
unavailable in March 1997. However, my own approach has many points of contact with the
policies proposed by these organizations.
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rare. The fight against high level political corruption is inevitably
political because top leaders are involved in malfeasance. A successful
effort to reduce corruption may, however, be a condition for efficient
economic growth.
The World Bank is a development institution, but it is also a political
animal. As a coalition of most of the countries of the world, it has no
choice. Firms based in donor countries want to continue contracting
with borrower countries under World Bank loans; borrowers want to
maintain Bank support. These interests of donors and borrowers form
the political coalition that supports the Bank. Thus, there is a bias in
favor of making loans without asking too many questions about the
integrity of the projects. This bias is exacerbated by the conditions
under which loans are made. They are tied to the fiscal health of the
borrowing government, not the success of the individual project. Thus,
the Bank itself has little financial incentive to monitor the integrity of
individual projects. Those who wrote the Bretton Woods Convention
establishing the World Bank sought to counter this bias with a strong
focus on economic rationality. The emphasis on technical and eco-
nomic training within the World Bank's professional staff is the organi-
zational response to these pressures. Unfortunately, recent experience
suggests that it is insufficient and that a more direct approach is
needed. An explicit concern with corruption is consistent with a focus
on economic rationality and is one way to counter some of the political
pressures faced by the Bank. The bias in favor of uncritical lending
counsels an explicit concern with malfeasance in order to preserve the
Bank's commitment to economic efficiency and the alleviation of
poverty.
In constructing an overall lending plan for a borrower country, the
identification of beneficiaries is a necessary first step. The World Bank
need not accept the priorities expressed by a country's rulers if the
regime either represents only a portion of the population or is inordi-
nately concerned with personal enrichment. With the growth of com-
mercial lending to the developing world in recent years, the World
Bank can focus more firmly on the goals of reducing poverty and aiding
institutional development.
Because corruption is usually considered wrong in itself, its mere
existence is a cause for concern. An economist, however, takes a more
skeptical view-arriving at that conclusion only after understanding
corruption's impact on the efficiency and equity of the economic
system. I, therefore, begin with an overview of the economic costs and
causes of corruption before focusing on policy options for the World
Bank.
[Vol. 29
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I. THE COSTS AND CAUSES OF CORRUPTION 2
Research on corruption and on the quality of government institu-
tions indicates that strong legal and governmental institutions and low
levels of corruption have beneficial effects on economic growth and
other economic variables.3 Because the corruption indices are highly
correlated with other measures of bureaucratic efficiency, such as the
level of red tape and the quality of the judiciary, these studies are
unable to distinguish the marginal effect of any one of these measures
holding the others constant. The data are consistent with the claim that
corruption is a function of the level of red tape, but the level of red tape
is itself partly a function of the prevalence of corruption. Corruption is
a symptom of other underlying problems, rather than an independent
variable.4 Foreign direct investment (FDI) is also negatively associated
with high levels of corruption. There is nothing special about East
Asian countries; for them, as well, corruption discouraged FDI. 5
2. This portion of the Essay is derived from one section of Corruption and Development,
prepared for the May 1997 Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics. It will be
published in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1997 (Joseph Stiglitz
& Boris Pleskovic eds., 1998).
3. For example, work by Paolo Mauro at the IMF demonstrates that high levels of corruption
are associated with lower levels of investment as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in a
cross-section of countries. See Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q. J. ECON. 681 (1995)
[hereinafter Mauro, Corruption and Growth]; see also Paulo Mauro, The Effects of Corruption on Growth,
Investment, and Government Expenditure: A .Cross-Country Analysis, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 83-107 (Kimberly Ann Elliot ed., 1997) [hereinafter Mauro, Effects of Corruption on
Growth]. A one standard deviation (2.4) improvement in the corruption index is associated with
over a four percentage-point increase in the investment rate and over a half a percentage-point
increase in the annual growth rate of per capita GDP. See Mauro, Effects of Corruption on Growth,
supra, at 91. In Corruption and Growth, Mauro uses a subjective index of corruption compiled by
Business International (BI) from its correspondents throughout the world. The index, which
covers 67 countries, omits Eastern Europe, China, and the Middle Eastern oil countries. It ranks
countries on a scale of zero to ten based on ajudgment of how frequently corruption was required.
in business transactions. High numbers indicate low levels of corruption. The BI data also include
numerous other measures of the climate for business. The data set is published as an appendix in
Mauro, Corruption and Growth. In Effects of Corruption on Growth, Mauro combines the BI data with
an index for 1982-1995 derived from the International Country Risk Guide prepared by Political
Risk Services. See id. at 88-89. Statistical tests can then be run for a group of 106 countries. The two
indices are very highly correlated (r = 0.81). When both were available, Mauro averaged them
together. Otherwise he used the value of the single available index. See id.
4. An overall index of the riskiness of investing in a country, based on nine factors from the
BI index (one of which is the corruption index), was associated with both lower investment rates
and lower growth rates. See Mauro, Corruption and Growth, supra note 3, at 683-84.
5. See Shang-Jin Wei, How Taxing Is Corruption on International Investors? (Sept. 26, 1997) (draft
paper, on file with Law and Policy in International Business).
1997]
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To go beyond these macroeconomic findings, we need to isolate the
most important situations where corruption determines who obtains
the benefits and bears the costs of political, judicial, and bureaucratic
actions. Six broad, and sometimes overlapping, categories capture the
most important situations.
" The government may be charged with allocating a scarce
benefit to many individuals and firms using legal criteria
other than willingness to pay. Bribes clear the market.
" Officials in the public sector may have little incentive to do
their jobs well, given official pay scales and the level of
internal monitoring. Bribes act as incentive bonuses.
" Private firms and individuals seek to reduce the costs imposed
on them by government in the form of taxes, customs duties,
regulations. Bribes lower costs for those who pay them.
" Governments frequently transfer large financial benefits to
private firms through procurement contracts, privatizations,
and the award of concessions. Bribes divide monopoly rents
between private investors and public officials.
" Bribes can substitute for legal forms of political influence. Bribery
of politicians buys influence, and bribery by politicians buys votes.
* The judiciary has the power to impose costs and transfer
resources between litigants. Bribes can override legal norms.
I will discuss the first four items in more detail because they are the
most relevant to World Bank policies and programs designed to limit
corruption.
A. Payments that Equate Supply and Demand
Governments frequently provide goods and services for free or sell
them below market prices. Often dual prices exist. For example, until
recently in China, some producer goods were sold at both state-
subsidized prices and on the free market. Not surprisingly, payoffs to
obtain supplies at state prices were reportedly common. 6 Multiple
6. See, e.g., Ting Gong, Corruption and Reform in China: An Analysis of Unintended Consequences,
19 CRIME L. & Soc. CHANGE 311 (1993); Y. Hao & Michael Johnston, Reform at the Crossroads: An
Analysis of Chinese Corruption, 19 AsIAN PERSP. 117 (1995). When oil prices in Nigeria were set
artificially low relative to the market price in neighboring Benin, smuggling facilitated by
corruption was widespread according to a report in a Nigerian newsmagazine. The price
difference provided benefits both to the smugglers and to the officials who were paid to overlook
the illegal trade. See NEWSWATcH, Camel Through the Needle's Eye, reprinted in ENERGY SEcrOR
[Vol. 29
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exchange rates and import quotas are frequent sources of payoffs.
When the supply of credit and the rate of interest are controlled by the
state (as in Eastern Europe and Korea), bribes may be paid for access.7
The incentives to make payoffs are clear enough in these cases, but
what are their efficiency consequences? Suppose, first, that the briber is
qualified for a scarce benefit, but is required to pay for it. If the corrupt
market operates efficiently, the service will be provided to the appli-
cants with the highest willingness to pay. Consider, however, the ways in
which inefficient or unfair results can arise even in this simple case.
First, the goals of a program may be undermined if the services are
provided only to those with the highest willingness to pay. This will
obviously be true for programs designed to benefit the needy or the
well-qualified.8 Second, corrupt markets are likely to differ from open,
competitive ones.9 The illegality of bribery induces participants to
spend resources to keep the transaction secret. Information about
bribe prices will not be well-publicized, and prices may be sticky
because of the difficulty of communicating market information. Some
potential participants may refuse to enter the market because of moral
scruples and fear of punishment, and public officials may themselves
MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME & WORLD BANK WESTERN AFRICA DEP'T, REPORT No. 11672-
UNI, ANNEX 26, NIGERIA: ISSUES AND OPnONS IN THE ENERGY SECTOR 175-77 (July 1993) (excerpts
from Feb. 3, 1991, issue of NEWSWATCH).
7. Interviews with business people in Eastern Europe and Russia indicate that payoffs are
frequently needed to obtain credit. See Martha de Melo et al., Pioneers for Profit: St. Petersburg
Entrepreneurs in Services, 9 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 425, 434-35 (1995); LEnLA M. WEBSTER, THE
EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE SECTOR MANUFACTURING IN HUNGARY 59 (World Bank Technical Paper No.
229, 1993); see also LEILA M. WEBSTER & JOSHUA CHARAP, THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE SECTOR
MANUFACTURING IN ST. PETERSBURG 56-57 (World Bank Technical Paper No. 228, 1993). In
Lebanon, a similar survey revealed that loans were not available without the payment of bribes. See
ISIL YAPRAK & LEILA WEBSTER, SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN LEBANON: A SURVEY (World Bank
Final Report, 1995).
8. A student of microfinance programs, Marguerite Robinson, found that programs that
provide below market credit to the rural poor are often corrupt and provide aid only to elites. See
New Bank Lends Support to Vietnam's Rural Poor, Reuters World Service, Aug. 18, 1996, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUWLD File. Another example is corruption in public housing programs
in the United States where the number of qualified households always far outstrips the number of
places in subsidized units. In India, some states provide a means tested pension to the poorest
people. The number who qualify exceeds the funds available. Nongovernmental organizations
who work with the poor report that applicants must pay to qualify and then must pay postal
workers to deliver the benefit checks.
9. SeeJean Cartier-Bresson, The Economics of Corruption in Europe, in DEMOCRACY AND CORRUP-
TION IN EUROPE 148, 160-62 (Donatella Della Porta & Yves M6ry eds., 1997). See generally DIEGO
GAMBETrA, THE SICILIAN MAFIA 195-244 (1993); SUSAN ROsE-AcKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN
POLIrICAL ECONOMY (1978).
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limit their dealing to insiders and trusted friends. A corrupt system may
be not only less competitive, but also more uncertain than a legal
market.°
Furthermore, in practice, many officials can exercise monopoly
power by determining the quantity of services provided."' The official,
like a private monopolist, may seek to set supply below the officially
sanctioned level to increase the economic rents available for division.
Conversely, under other conditions, the corrupt official might seek to
provide an increased supply if the government has set the supply below
the monopoly level. In other situations, the service is not scarce, but is,
like a passport, a driver's license or an old age pension, available to all
who "qualify." Officials, however, may have sufficient monopoly power
to create scarcity either by delaying approvals or withholding them
unless paid bribes.
Finally, bribes are frequently paid to permit unqualified people and
firms to obtain a benefit. Students might pay to alter the results of
university admissions tests, or people might pay doctors to declare
them eligible for disability payments. Andre Shleifer and Robert Vishny
call this case "corruption with theft."' 12 Clearly, the unqualified will
often have the highest willingness to pay because they have no legal way
to obtain the service.
B. Bribes as Incentive Payments for Bureaucrats
Bribes can be incentive payments for quality service. Because time is
money, firms and individuals may pay to avoid delay. In some economic
models, bribes have desirable incentive properties. For example, pay-
offs to those who manage queues can be efficient because they give
officials incentives both to favor those who value their time highly and
to work quickly.1 3 Alternatively, the corruption of tax collectors can be
efficient so long as the government can impose a binding overall
10. For example, World Bank-sponsored surveys of business people in Pakistan and the
Ukraine indicate high interfirm variability, with those who obtain services corruptly having no
recourse if the bribed official does not live up to his side of the bargain. See also Susan
Rose-Ackerman & Andrew Stone, The Costs of Corruption for Private Business: Evidence from World
Bank Surveys (1996) (paper on file with author).
11. See, e.g., Ronald Findlay, Is The New Political Economy Relevant to Developing Countries, in
POLITICS AND POLICYMAKING IN DEVELOPMENT: PERSPECTIVES ON THE NEW POLrrICAL ECONOMY (Gerald
M. Meier ed., 1991); ROsE-AcIsmAN, supra note 9; Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption,
108 Q.J. ECON. 599 (1993).
12. Shleifer &Vishny, supra note 11, at 601.
13. See Francis Lui, An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery, 93J. POL. ECON. 760 (1985).
[Vol. 29
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revenue constraint. 4 But the conclusion that the routine corruption of
those who manage queues and collect taxes should be tolerated is
extremely problematic. First, corruption is efficient only if officials have
limited discretion. For example, the tax collector must be able to do no
more than "discover" the tax liabilities of citizens and firms. In reality,
he might creatively "create" that tax liability as a bribe extraction
device, producing an arbitrary and unfair pattern of payments.
Second, noncorrupt alternatives exist that avoid the costs of illegal
payment systems. Queues can be managed through a set of differential
fees. Revenue collection offices are sometimes permitted to retain a
portion of the taxes they collect. Third, firms pay bribes to obtain
certainty,15 but payments made to increase certainty for individual
firms result in a wide variance in conditions across firms.
In short, bribes can sometimes be characterized as incentive pay-
ments to public officials. A policy of active tolerance, however, espe-
cially by outside aid donors such as the World Bank, is likely to be
destructive of the prospects for long-term reform. Payoffs that are
widely viewed as acceptable should be legalized, but not all "incentive
pay" schemes will actually improve bureaucratic efficiency.
C. Bribes to Reduce Costs
Governments impose regulations, levy taxes, and enforce criminal
laws. Individuals and firms may pay for relief from these costs. They
may collude with tax collectors and customs officials to lower the sums
collected. The economic impact of bribes paid to avoid regulations, to
supersede the criminal law, and to lower taxes depends upon the
efficiency of the underlying programs which are subject to corrupt
distortions. Given an inefficient legal framework, payoffs to avoid
regulations and taxes may increase efficiency. This defense of payoffs is
commonly espoused by foreign investors in the developing world. It is a
pragmatic justification that grows out of frustration with the existing
14. The minister sets a revenue target, a nominal tax liability schedule, and the wage rate of
the tax collector. Corruption gives the tax collector an incentive to seek tax revenue and is
tolerated so long as the collector turns in an amount equal to the revenue target. The greater the
difference between nominal tax liabilities and the revenue target, the higher the rate of
corruption. See Frank Flatters & W. Bentley MacLeod, Administrative Corruption and Taxation, 2
INT'L TAx & PUB. FIN. 397 (1995).
15. Legal and regulatory uncertainty is frequently mentioned by business people interviewed
in surveys in the developing world. See, e.g., Webster & Charap, supra note 7, at 55; Webster, sura
note 7, at 60.
1997]
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legal order. It attempts to justify corruption carried out to obtain
benefits to which one is not legally entitled.
But are individuals and firms obligated only to obey laws that they
judge to be efficient and just? In the developed world, industry rarely
responds to environmental and health and safety rules it finds burden-
some by bribing U.S. officials or enlisting the help of criminals to evade
the law. Instead, firms work to change the laws in Congress, make legal
campaign contributions, lobby public agencies, and bring lawsuits that
challenge laws and regulations. One can complain about the impor-
tance of wealth and large corporations in U.S. political life, but
well-documented lobbying activities and campaign contributions are at
least superior to secret bribes in maintaining democratic institutions.
Some of the same firms that engage in legal political activities at
home feel less constrained about violating laws in developing and
transitional economies. Because the United States outlaws bribes paid
abroad to obtain business, 1 6 U.S. companies face a domestic legal
constraint. But the perceived importance of that constraint suggests
that multinationals do not generally feel an obligation to obey the law
in the developing countries where they operate. Unfortunately, how-
ever, investors will pay bribes not only to avoid inefficient rules and taxes,
but also to reduce the impact of all state-imposed burdens, justified or
not. It seems strange indeed to tolerate business firms' judgments that
a well-placed payoff is justified because it increases their profits. Such
an attitude can do serious harm to nations struggling to build a viable
state. These states need to develop public institutions that translate
popular demands into law, that establish a credible commitment to the
enforcement of these laws, and that provide legal recourse to those who
think they have been wronged. If, instead, investors and ordinary
citizens make individualized judgments about which laws are legiti-
mate, the attempt to create and maintain state institutions will founder.
Bribery will determine not only which laws are enforced, but also what
laws are enacted.
17
16. The act is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b) & (d) (1) & (g)-(h),
78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (a) & (c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
17. Bribes paid to obtain the enactment of favorable laws by a democratic legislature are a
particularly good example of the often large gap between the size of the bribe paid and the impact
of corruption on society. If legislators cannot coordinate their actions, they may be inexpensive to
bribe because no one lawmaker has much bargaining power. See ROSE-ACERMAN, supra note 9, at
15-32; see also Eric Rasmusen & J. Mark Rarnseyer, Cheap Bribes and the Corruption Ban: A
Coordination Game Among Rational Legislators, 78 PUB. CHOICE 305 (1994) (developing a model of
this case).
[Vol. 29
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D. Payments to Obtain Major Contracts, Concessions, and Privatized Firms
Corrupt payments to win major contracts, concessions, and privatiz-
ing companies are generally the preserve of large businesses and
high-level officials. 18 Is there anything distinctive about such corrup-
tion, other than the size of the deals? They appear analogous to cases in
which government disburses a scarce benefit, only this time the value of
the benefit is measured in many million, not a few thousand, dollars.
But does the scale of the corrupt deal and involvement of high-level officials
change anything?
One difference is the likelihood that rulers are effectively insulated
from prosecution and can thus be less restrained in their corrupt
demands than lower level officials. Second, those who obtain benefits
through the bribery of low-level officials are rarely thought to behave
inefficiently once the benefit is obtained. In contrast, for major deals,
the contrary argument is often made. But is there anything to it? To
isolate these distinct issues, consider the example of a logging conces-
sion obtained corruptly by a company over the higher bids of competi-
tors. If corruption does not restrict entry and if the official cannot
affect the size of the concession, the high briber is the firm that values
the benefit the most. The losses are the extra taxes that must be
collected and the foregone benefits of public programs not under-
taken.
Now consider the firm that has obtained a secure, long-term timber
concession at a bargain price even when the bribe is included. If it
operates in the international market, its subsequent actions should
depend upon the market for timber. The fact that it has underpaid for
the concession should not affect its production decisions. It still seeks
to maximize profits, and the concession payment is a sunk cost. This
claim of no impact on firm behavior is too simple to reflect reality. The
operative terms are secure and long-term. Corruption introduces uncer-
tainties into the economic environment that may give the firm a
short-run orientation.1 9 There are two reasons for this. First, the
18. See GEORGE MOODEY-STUART, GRAND CORRUPTION IN THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT I (Trans-
parency International Working Paper, 1994) (calling this "grand corruption").
19. SeeJACQUELINE COOLIDGE & SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, HIGH LEVEL RENT-SEEKING AND CORRUP-
TION IN AFRICAN REGIMES: THEORY AND CASES (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.
1780, 1997). For an example of the short-run orientation of corrupt timber concessionaires in
Malaysia, see Jeffrey R. Vincent & Clark S. Binkley, Forest-Based Industrialization: A Dynamic
Perspective, in MANAGING THE WORLD'S FoREsTs 93 (Narendra P. Sharma ed., 1992); see also Robert
T. Deacon, Deforestation and the Rule of Law in a Cross-Section of Countries, 70 LAND ECON. 414, 415
(1994) (reporting studies showing that security of tenure is negatively associated with deforesta-
1997]
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concessionaire may fear that those in power are vulnerable to over-
throw because of their corruption. A new regime may not honor the
old one's commitments. Second, even if the current regime remains in
power, the winner may fear the imposition of arbitrary demands once
investments are sunk. Competitors may be permitted to enter the
market or the contract may be voided for reasons of politics or greed. z
Thus the corrupt firm with a timber contract may cut down trees more
quickly than it would in less corrupt countries. It may also be reluctant
to invest in immovable capital that would be difficult to take out of the
country should conditions change.
II. THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK
Given the economic incentives for corruption, we can now ask what
the World Bank can do. Subject to limitations of mission and expertise,
there are three broad arenas for World Bank involvement. First, the
World Bank obviously has an interest in the effective use of its own
resources. This involves both better control of existing lending and a
willingness to withdraw from countries that are not using funds effi-
ciently to fulfill development objectives. Countries that lack basic
checks on malfeasance by top rulers should have to overcome a
presumption against Bank loans. Second, in cooperation with sympa-
thetic governments, the World Bank can support anticorruption efforts
and help reform underlying substantive laws that produce corrupt
incentives. Third, international efforts focus on reducing the willing-
ness of multinational businesses to pay bribes and on checking the flow
of illicit funds. Strategies include international treaties and actions by
multinational organizations such as the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Organization of
American States (OAS), efforts to convince countries to penalize.
overseas bribery, and the development of voluntary business codes of
conduct. Although international efforts are important, and the World
Bank ought to be involved in these discussions, I will not discuss them
tion rates and pointing to case studies showing that when property rights are poorly enforced,
deforestation is more rapid). Of course, corruption is only part of the reason why firms might have
a short-run orientation. Deacon shows that deforestation rates are associated with political
variables reflecting insecure ownership, but the explanatory power of his model is low. See id.
20. For example, in Malaysia, firms involved in the privatization of both electricity and
telecommunications have complained that the government has subsequently admitted numerous
additional competitors with strong political links. See Kieran Cooke, Malaysian Privatization Loses
Allure, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1995, at 6.
[Vol. 29
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further. Instead, I focus on the Bank's own lending activity and on
efforts to encourage reform in borrower countries.
A. Controlling Corruption in Project Loans and Grants
The World Bank, concerned with the success of the projects it
supports, will obviously be troubled by endemic corruption. For ex-
ample, suppose that twenty percent of aid funds is lost due to corrup-
tion. The twenty percent does not represent bribes per se, but rather
the inflated contracting costs and the loss of equipment and other
inputs from tolerating bribery. Thus, a project with a budget of $100
million could have been completed for $80 million in an honest
system. Consider a simple project where funds invested at time zero
earn a return in time one (and only in time one). Suppose that an
investment at time zero must earn a return of ten percent at time one
in order to pass Bank muster. Then an honestly administered project
would need to generate gross benefits of $88 million. The corrupt
projectwould need to produce returns of $110 million-a difference of
$22 million. A project that should have cost $80 million must return
$110 million in order to be worthwhile-a rate of return on produc-
tively used resources of 37.5%. Even in the developed world, not many
projects have such a high return. In the absence of corruption, many
more projects would seem worth doing.
Designing effective strategies for the World Bank requires a mixture
of analysis and political realism. Some countries have kleptocratic
rulers, often acting in concert with powerful private interests. Other
countries have weak governments, but are dominated by organized
mafias. In these cases, the Bank has only four choices: in kleptocracies,
it can pressure the ruler to reform as a condition for receiving Bank
loans; it can refuse to make new loans and can review old loans; it can
seek to reform self-contained portions of the state apparatus such as tax
and customs collection; and, when the state is weak, the Bank can
design programs to strengthen it in relation to powerful outsiders. The
first option may sometimes succeed, but it is a high risk strategy because
if it fails, the Bank is then entangled with a venal ruler. The second
option is an admission of defeat, but will be the only defensible strategy
in some cases. The third option requires extreme care or it can simply
become a device for entrenching a corrupt ruler and permitting him to
extract the country's wealth more efficiently. The fourth option may
have some promise, so long as the reformed institutions are not
themselves co-opted by corrupt outsiders. None of these options is very
attractive. The Bank should be willing to discontinue lending to
countries that do not use its funds efficiently.
1997]
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Until recently, the Bank's main focus has been on analytical rigor at
the project approval stage and on transparent procurement processes
under Bank loans. Some projects with strong support from a country's
rulers were not supported out of a concern that they would simply
create pools of rents for the powerful. Procurement guidelines sought
to assure competitive bidding on most large contracts, but worries
about corruption were implicit. In 1996, however, the Bank revised its
procurement guidelines to state explicitly that corruption and fraud
would be grounds for canceling a contract if the borrower did not take
appropriate action. Companies found to be corrupt by the Bank can be
excluded from bidding on future projects. The new rules permit Bank
audits of contractors and require contractors to record all payments to
agents both before and after the bidding, because such payments are
frequently the route by which payoffs are made.21 The importance of
these changes will depend upon how they are implemented in the field,
but they represent a promising first step.
Some anticorruption activists, such as the nonprofit group Transpar-
ency International, urge that potential bidders sign an Integrity Pact,
under which they pledge to refrain from corruption. If, expost, a firm is
found to have made payoffs, the Bank's new procurement provisions
would come into effect. Although such pledges look redundant be-
21. On July 23, 1996, the Executive Directors approved changes in the Bank's General
Conditions Applicable to Loan and Guarantee Agreements. See Memorandum from Myrna
Alexander, World Bank, to Staff Recipients of the Operational Manual (Sept. 9, 1996) <http://
www.worldbank.org/html/opr/opmanual/double.html>. Section 6.03 was expanded to include
corruption or fraud by representatives of the borrower or by the beneficiary of the loan as a
grounds for canceling the part of the loan affected. The borrowing country can, however, defend
itself against cancellation by taking "timely and appropriate action satisfactory to the Bank to
remedy the situation." General Conditions Applicable to Bank/IDA Loan/Credit Agreements § 6.03
<http://www.worldbank.org/html>. Furthermore, the Guidelines for Procurement under IBRD
Loans and IDA Credits amended to add a new paragraph 1.15 stating that the Bank will reject a
proposal for an award "if it determines that the bidder recommended for award has engaged in
corrupt or fraudulent practices in competing for the contract in question." World Bank,
Guidelines: Procurement underIBRD Loans and IDA Credits 1.15 <http://www.worldbank.org/html/
opr/procure/intro.html>. In other words, it is not sufficient to know that the bidder engaged in
corruption to obtain other contracts. However, the Bank will also cancel a contract if corrupt or
fraudulent practices are revealed after a contract is awarded. Firms found to have engaged in
corrupt or fraudulent practices with respect to Bank-financed projects will be declared ineligible
for further contracts "either indefinitely or for a stated period of time." The Bank can require that
it be able to inspect the records of suppliers and contractors relating to their Bank contracts. The
Bank also requires that all commissions paid to agents, both before and after the contract is
signed, be disclosed to the Bank. For an overview, see generally Ibrahim Shihata, Corruption: A
General Review with an Emphasis on the Role of the World Bank, 15 DICKJ. INT'L L. 451 (1997); Stuart H.
Deming, Foreign Corrupt Practices, 31 INT'L LAw. 695 (1997).
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cause corruption is, in any case, illegal, they have the advantage of
highlighting the issue in countries with little respect for the formal law
on the books. Nevertheless, a serious attempt to implement the Bank's
new procurement provisions will require institutional solutions. The
procurement changes put the responsibility on the Bank and do not
give any explicit rights to disappointed contractors. Nevertheless, disap-
pointed contractors are likely to be an important source of information
for the Bank. However, losers have an incentive to accuse the winner of
corruption even if none occurred. The Bank needs a way to make
constructive use of the information contractors can provide without
becoming enmeshed in investigating the claims of every disappointed
bidder. It may need to consider a forum for the hearing of such
claims.22
The Bank may place too much emphasis on International Competi-
tive Bidding (ICB). Although other forms of procurement are possible,
there is a presumption in favor of ICB although it may actually
encourage corruption and poor performance in some cases. When the
risks of corruption are high, projects could be designed with the
fragility of a country's procurement processes in mind. Project officers
would favor off-the-shelf items sold in international markets over
special purpose goods. They could develop external benchmarks for
certain types of procurement. 23 In such cases, the price of comparable
products in the private sector can help limit the price inflation that
often accompanies payoffs in procurement.
Sometimes the procurement process works well, but problems arise
during implementation. In addition to outright theft of such useful
items as vehicles, medicines, or computers, outsiders may bribe officials
for privileged access to the benefits of the project, be they jobs,
building materials, or subcontracts. The World Bank's Controllers
Office is exploring ways to improve monitoring. Instead of relying
mostly on paper records, Bank auditors are considering increasing the
number of physical inspections and on site reviews.
The World Bank must acknowledge the political and organizational
dynamics that make corruption control difficult. They need to monitor
the performance of ongoing projects and be ready to discontinue those
that have been undermined by corruption. They also need to review
22. See Daniel D. Bradlow, A Test Case for the World Bank, 11 Am. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 247
(1996) (for a discussion of the experience of the Inspection Panel, which was established in 1993).
23. See generally Augustine Ruzindana, Combating Corruption in Uganda, in UGANDA: LANDMARKS
IN REBUILDING A NATION 191 (P. Langseth et al. ed., 1995) (discussing methods to combat
corruption).
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their lending priorities and discontinue lending to kleptocratic coun-
tries.
B. Supporting Reform Programs24
The World Bank can be most effective in countries where a relatively
honest top level official faces systems of low-level corruption. The goal
is to eliminate the conditions that produce a high incidence of corrup-
tion among public officials. Four types of reform falling within the
Bank's mandate are worthy of focus: improved law enforcement, civil
service reform, increased governmental accountability, and reductions
in the discretion and monopoly power of government officials.
1. Credible Law Enforcement
A basic condition for corruption control is a viable legal framework
that enforces the law without political favoritism or arbitrariness. The
goal is both to deter those tempted to engage in corrupt acts and to
educate the public to resist criminal conduct by officials. Tough laws
are not sufficient. Many highly corrupt countries have exemplary
formal statutes which lack real meaning because they are seldom
enforced. A country serious about reform must have effective investiga-
tion and prosecutorial bodies and a well-functioning judicial system
that is not itself corrupt.
An independent judiciary can be invaluable in checking official
malfeasance. In India, the supreme court pushed forward a corruption
investigation that the government had sought to quash.2" In Brazil, the
supreme court's insistence that the congressional vote on the presi-
dent's impeachment for corruption be made public helped keep the
process honest.26 The World Bank is beginning work on judicial
reform, especially in Latin America, but the projects are all at an early
stage .27
Some countries have had success with independent anticorruption
commissions or inspectors general reporting only to the chief execu-
24. This section is a revised version of a portion of Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Develop-
ment, supra note 2.
25. See Christopher Thomas, Court Removes Rao as Head of Political Bribes Investigation, TIMES
(London), Mar. 2,1996, at 13.
26. See Barbara Geddes & Artur Ribeiro Neto, Institutional Sources of Corruption in Brazi 13
THIRD WORLD Q. 641,658 (1992).
27. See Ibrahim Shihata, Judicial Reform in Developing Countries and the Role of the World Bank
(World Bank Technical Paper No. 280, 1995), in JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBaN 219, 226 (M. Rowat et al. eds., 1995).
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tive or the parliament. The most well known is Hong Kong's Indepen-
dent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), which reported only to
the Governor General and had extensive powers.28 The Commission
apparently succeeded in transforming citizens' beliefs and expecta-
tions. Surveys of the public carried out between 1977 and 1994 indicate
that public perceptions of corruption fell in the early years of the ICAC.
Indirect evidence suggests that corruption did, in fact, decline along
with public perceptions. A number of other jurisdictions have similar
institutions, including Singapore, Malaysia, Botswana, Malawi, and the
Australian state of New South Wales. 29 Yet, an independent anticorrup-
tion commission is not without problematic aspects. Its widespread
powers could be abused in systems less committed to the rule of law.
The Hong Kong case indicates that a tough, independent anticorrup-
tion agency can be a potent tool so long as it represents a credible
long-term commitment and includes checks on its own ability to be
misused for political ends.
2. The Civil Service
Many developing countries have very poorly paid civil servants.
Officials must supplement their pay with second jobs or payoffs. World
Bank and IMF data suggest that there is a negative correlation between
civil service wages (relative to private sector wages) and the level of
corruption.30 Civil service reform projects supported by the World
Bank should be designed to include an explicit concern for reducing
corruption.
If officials are paid much less than people with similar training
elsewhere in the economy, only those who possess weak qualifications
and are willing to accept bribes will be attracted to the public sector.31
Civil service pay should be set at least equal to that of equivalent
28. See ROBERT KLrrGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION 98-121 (1988); Melanie Manion, Policy
Instruments and Political Context: Transforming a Culture of Corruption in Hong Kong, prepared for the
Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies in Honolulu, HI (Apr. 11-14, 1996).
29. See Max J. Skidmore, Promise and Peril in Combatting Corruption: Hong Kong's ICAC, 547
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCi. 118, 122 (1996).
30. See CAROLINE VAN RIJCKEGHEM & BEATRICE WEDER, CORRUPTION AND THE RATE OF TEMPTA-
TION: Do Low WAGES IN THE CIVIL SERVICE CAUSE CORRUPTION? (International Monetary Fund
Working Paper No. 73, 1997); see also BARBARA NUNBERG &JOHN NELms, CIVIL SERVICE REFORM AND
THE WORLD BANK (World Bank Discussion Paper No. 161, 1995).
31. Some claim that Botswana's status as a relatively uncorrupt African country stems from its
rulers' commitment to a professional and well-paid civil service. See, e.g., NIMROD RAPHAELi, PUBLIC
SECTOR MANAGEMENT IN BOTSWANA (World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 709, 1984).
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positions in the private sector in order to make it possible to recruit
based on merit and to permit those selected to serve without resorting
to corruption. Wages in the formal sector, however, will not be the
correct benchmark in countries with a large informal sector. Alterna-
tive employment for most civil servants will often be in small scale
private businesses that operate "off-the-books." There must also be a
transparent, merit-based system of selecting civil servants; otherwise,
people who are unable to command comparable private sector wages
will pay the powerful to be allotted desirable governmentjobs.
Pay reform is necessary, but not sufficient. Penalties must be tied to
the marginal benefits of accepting payoffs. In cases where corruption's
only efficiency cost stems from its illegality, the payments should be
legalized. In the design of such systems, however, it is important to
avoid giving bureaucrats monopoly power that they can use to extract
increased levels of rents.
Civil service reform will generally need to be a thoroughgoing effort.
Small increases in wages and improvements in working conditions may
have little impact. The system may be caught in a trap where high
corruption levels beget high corruption levels. If almost everyone
expects to pay bribes, the result may be a self-fulfilling prophecy.
One reason why civil service pay has fallen so rapidly in recent years
is the fiscal pressure on governments. An across-the-board pay cut,
often accomplished through inflation, is politically easier to manage
than the selective firing of workers. Conversely, countries making good
progress in achieving fiscal balance may jeopardize their success by
bowing to pressure from civil servants for across-the-board pay hikes.
For example, in 1992 Ghana increased all civil servants' wages by eighty
percent.3 2 Given the importance of resisting such pressures, interna-
tional institutions can be helpful in easing the transition to a compe-
tent, less numerous, and well paid civil service.
3. Accountability to Citizens
The private sector can be an important check on the arbitrary
exercise of power by government, but only if the government provides
information on its actions and if people can organize into associations.
Accountability to the public requires both that individuals can find out
what the state is doing and that they can use this information to hold
public actors'accountable.
Governments must publish budgets, revenue collections, statutes
32. See ROBERT P. ARMSTRONG, GHANA COUNTRYASSISTANCE REVIEW 20 (World Bank, 1996).
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and rules, and the proceedings of legislative bodies. Financial data
should be independently audited. Secret funds available to chief execu-
tives and top ministers are an invitation to corruption. Several World
Bank projects have helped transitional economies and developing
countries publish timely and accurate documents about the basic
operations of government. Other Bank projects have helped countries,
especially in Latin America and Africa, reform their budgetary account-
ing processes to make them more transparent.33 These reforms provide
an important background for anticorruption efforts.
Procurement regulations must keep the process open and fair.
Scandals frequently occur because top officials overrule tender boards
or because lower level officials operate without formal controls on their
purchasing decisions. The Bank has helped some countries, especially
in Eastern Europe, develop procurement codes. But putting good laws
on the books is not sufficient; countries need help in implementing
them in an effective way.
Freedom of Information acts in the United States and in a number of
European countries are an important precondition for effective public
oversight. These laws permit citizens to request information as mem-
bers of the public without showing that their own personal situation
will be affected. The Bank could help countries develop such statutory
safeguards.
Finding out what is happening is of Jittle value unless people can use
the knowledge to influence government. In countries without demo-
cratic electoral systems or independent courts, other forms of citizen
voice need to be encouraged. Publicity through the media is an
important option. Even an undemocratic ruler is likely to be sensitive
to public opinion. The World Bank's Educational Development Insti-
tute has made a start in this area with educational programs for African
journalists to teach them how to engage in investigative reporting.
Individuals face a familiar free rider problem in seeking to control
political and bureaucratic processes and to limit malfeasance. Informa-
tion may be available in principle, but no one may have an incentive to
look at it. Laws that make it easy to establish associations and nonprofit
organizations will help. For example, Transparency International, a
Berlin-based nonprofit organization committed to fighting corruption
worldwide, has local chapters that carry out a range of activities,
including participation in Integrity Workshops organized with the help
of the World Bank and the bilateral aid agencies. These workshops
33. See id.
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bring together concerned people from both the public and the private
sectors to discuss the problem of corruption.
Nonprofit organizations can carry out and publish public opinion
surveys that reveal public attitudes toward government services. Pioneer-
ing work of this sort has been carried out by the Public Affairs Centre in
Bangalore, India. It produces "report cards" on services to the urban
poor in five cities. The center found that "speed" money was ubiqui-
tous with up to one-third of the slum dwellers reporting that they
needed to pay bribes to obtain services.34 An alternative is the creation
of telephone hotlines so citizens can complain directly to the govern-
ment.
Some countries, worried that nongovernmental organizations will be
used to monitor their performance, limit such groups or make it very
costly for them to organize. Formal legal constraints may be high, and
groups and their members may be subject to surveillance and harass-
ment. The Bank should help countries promulgate permissive statutes
governing the incorporation of nonprofit organizations.
Individuals are unlikely to complain peacefully about government
operations unless the legal structure protects individuals against state
crackdowns. When an official tries to extort a bribe from individuals or
firms, do the individuals have any recourse? The Bank can help
countries obtain routine services for poor people without bribery
through experience with lower-level tribunals and ombudsmen.
4. Reducing the Incentives for Payoffs
Reforms that simply make corruption risky are not sufficient. Reform
must also reduce the level of benefits under the control of public
officials. The strategy must do this without eliminating programs that
have strong public justifications and without simply shifting the ben-
efits into the private sector where they will show up as monopoly
profits. Such reforms are particularly in tune with Bank priorities and
expertise.
The most obvious option is simply to eliminate laws and programs
that are permeated with corruption. If the state has no authority to
restrict exports or license businesses, no one will pay bribes in those
areas. If a subsidy program is eliminated, the bribes that accompanied
it will disappear as well. If price controls are lifted, market prices will
34. See Samuel Paul, Evaluating Public Services: A Case Study on Bangalore, India, 67 NEw
DIRECIONS FOR EVALUATION 155, 160-62 (1995).
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express scarcity values, not bribes. If a parastatal is the locus of corrupt
payoffs, move it into the private sector.
Reforms that increase the competitiveness of the economy will
reduce corrupt incentives. Policies that reduce the controls on foreign
trade, remove entry barriers for private industry, and privatize state
firms in a way that assures competition can contribute to the fight
against corruption. But any move toward deregulation and privatiza-
tion must be carried out with care. Deregulation in one area may
increase corruption elsewhere.3 5 Privatization processes can be cor-
rupted, as well as the new regulatory institutions needed in the
privatized world. Of course, privatization and deregulation are, on
balance, desirable in a wide range of cases, but World Bank reformers
should look carefully at the incentives for rent-seeking that remain.36
Many regulatory and spending programs ought to be reformed, not
eliminated. Corruption in the collection of taxes cannot be solved by
failing to collect revenue. One solution is to clarify and streamline the
necessary laws to reduce official discretion. Rules could be made more
transparent with publicly provided justifications. Governments might
favor simple nondiscretionary tax, spending, and regulatory laws as a
way of limiting opportunities for corruption. Obviously, the value of
35. For example, a successful effort to reduce corruption in the transport of agricultural
products in one African country increased the corruption in neighboring countries on the same
transport route. A USAID-sponsored project was successful in reducing the number of bribe-
extraction checkpoints established by police and customs officials along onion transport routes in
Niger. Unfortunately, the ultimate outcome was an increase in payoffs and tax levels in C6te
d'Ivoire as the onions neared their destination-the food markets of Abidjan. See Glen Rogers &
Sid Mohammed Iddal, Niger: Reduction of llegal Road Payments, in GOVERNANCE AND THE ECONOMY tN
AFRICA: TOOLS FOR ANALYSIS AND REFORM OF CORRUPTION (1996). This example illustrates that
corruption can be reduced through a concerted effort, but it also highlights the importance of
taking a systemic approach to corruption reform, even if that means crossing national boundaries.
36. The integrity of the privatization process is especially at issue in countries in transition.
Although some industrial plants in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are out-of-date,
these countries are nevertheless largely developed countries rich in natural resources. The value
of sharing in the privatization of a socialist state dwarfs the benefits of sharing in the privatization
of a public utility in Western Europe or a steel mill in the developing world. In formerly socialist
countries, the risk is not simply corruption and insider deals, but domination by organized
criminal groups. Criminal groups, wealthy from both illegal and legitimate businesses, seek to
share in the distribution of the countries' wealth. If they can create an atmosphere of uncertainty
and the threat of violence, they will drive competitors away, especially western firms. The risk of
organized crime driving away legitimate investment suggests that great care ought to be taken to
establish a transparent and reliable legal environment before privatization is undertaken. This was
not done in many countries that had already privatized, with predictable results. See Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Reducing Bribery in the Public Sector, in CORRUPTION & DEMOCRACY 21 (Duc V. Trang
ed., 1994); Louise I. Shelley, Post-Soviet Organized Crime, 2 DEMOKRATIZATSYA 341 (1994).
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such reforms depends upon the costs of limiting the flexibility of public
officials. Sometimes a certain risk of corruption will need to be toler-
ated because of the benefits of a case-by-case approach to program
administration. Economists have long recommended reforms in areas
such as environmental protection, that introduce market based schemes
to limit the discretion of regulators. They also recommend user fees for
scarce government services. These reforms have the additional advan-
tage of removing corrupt incentives by replacing bribes with legal
payments. The sale of water and grazing rights, tradeable pollution
rights, and the sale of import and export licenses can improve the
efficiency of government operations while limiting corruption.
The final proposals involve the introduction of competitive pressures
within government to lower the bargaining power of officials. When
bribes are paid for such benefits as licenses and permits, which are not
constrained by budgetary limits, overlapping, competitive bureaucratic
jurisdictions can reduce corruption. Because clients can apply to any of
a number of officials and can go to a second one if the first turns them
down, no one official has much monopoly power. Thus, no one can
extract a very large payoff. For qualified clients, bribes will be no larger
than the cost of reapplication. Unqualified clients will still pay bribes,
but even they will not pay much so long as they, too, can try another
official. If some officials establish an honest reputation, qualified
applicants will prefer those officials, thus reducing the gains to the
corrupt. A few honest officials can overturn a corrupt system if conges-
tion is not a serious problem. This dynamic, however, only works if
individuals are qualified for the benefit. If, instead, they are unquali-
fied, the honesty of some officials increases the gains to those who are
corrupt, inducing more to become corrupt.
When officials, such as police officers, can impose costs, another type
of overlapping jurisdiction model should be considered. Police officers
seeking to control illegal businesses can be given overlapping enforce-
ment areas. Gamblers and drug dealers will not pay much to an
individual policeman if a second one may come along later and also
demand a payoff. The first one is simply unable to supply protection.
This system may work better if law enforcement officers belong to
different police forces-local, state, or federal, for example. Then
collusion among officers to defeat the system will be less likely.
III. CONCLUSIONS
Efforts by the World Bank to keep its own projects clean while
ignoring the rest of a borrower government's activities will be ulti-
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mately ineffective as corrupt officials and private individuals and firms
seek opportunities elsewhere. Clearly, the Bank ought not to abandon
efforts to keep its own projects free of corruption, but the more serious
that effort becomes, the more it will need to help countries reduce
corruption throughout their institutions. This should involve projects
to help reform public sector institutions and to create a viable environ-
ment for private sector development. In addition to general programs
to improve government performance and public accountability, how-
ever, more targeted projects are likely to be worthwhile. Each country
will need to make its own assessment, but surveys and case studies
suggest three areas where corruption imposes the most costs in many
countries. First, in many countries, tax and customs revenues are very
low, and the pattern of payments is inequitable due to payoffs. The
response should be both to simplify the tax laws to reduce bureaucratic
discretion and to reorganize the bureaucracy to improve oversight and
incentives for good performance. Second, the regulation of business is
often so complex, time-consuming, and intrusive that the development
of a healthy private sector is affected. Here, the answer is a hard look at
tax and regulatory laws to see which can be eliminated, which can be
simplified, and which require improved enforcement. Third, states
sometimes sponsor capital projects that are too large and complex.
Evidence of the inappropriate scale and design of projects should be
sufficient to cancel them. Cancellation should be combined with
improved procedures for future project approvals or the pattern will
repeat.
To reiterate my basic recommendations, the World Bank should
address corruption on three fronts:
" First, the Bank needs to make it more clear than it has in the
past that corruption will not be accepted as normal in its own
grants and loans and must move to cancel projects where
corruption is uncovered or where cost overruns suggest that
either venality or incompetence is pervasive. It may need to
discontinue lending to some countries where corruption at
the top levels of government appears endemic.
" Second, the Bank should actively support international ef-
forts to reduce the acceptability of bribery in international
businesses and assist efforts to establish international budget-
ary, accounting, and procurement standards and to train
officials to use them.
* Third, grant and loan projects should focus on creating an
environment favorable to shared growth and the alleviation
1997]
HeinOnline  -- 29 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 113 1997-1998
LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
* of poverty. The Bank could select a few countries with support-
ive governments and work with them to design programs that
could serve as examples for others. Country officials, working
with Bank staff, should design programs that reduce underly-
ing corrupt incentives, facilitate civil service reform, open
government to outside scrutiny, and strengthen formal institu-
tions of oversight and control (such as the courts). This
sounds like a large order, but piecemeal efforts are unlikely to
do much lasting good.
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